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demonstrated that the familiar data, when analyzed from an absolute perspective, could show that the 
poor had benefited from growth. I found that the entire income distribution shifted, benefiting every 
income class; that the proportion of the economically active population with incomes below the poverty 
level (as defined by Brazilian standards) declined during the decade; that those who remained poor were 
less poor than before in absolute terms; and that the rate of growth of income among the poor was at 
least as great as the rate of growth among the nonpoor. These results came as a surprise to me, and so I 
did not expect that my conclusion – that Brazil seemed to do better on the income distribution front than 
many observers had originally thought-would be received uncritically by others. 
The preceding comments paint a less rosy picture. Previously used data are shown to be deficient in 
important respects and new evidence is offered which contradicts the old. Because of this new and more 
critical evidence, I myself am less certain of what actually happened. But as I shall show, this latest re-
examination also confirms some of the more positive aspects of the Brazilian experience. It is fair to say 
that neither the most favorable nor the most unfavorable position can be sustained unambiguously. 
Keywords 
development, economic growth, Brazil, income distribution, poverty 
Disciplines 
Economics | Labor Economics | Labor Relations 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Fields, G. S. (1980). Who benefits from economic development?: Reply [Electronic version]. American 
Economic Review 70(1), 257-262. 
Required Publisher Statement 
© American Economic Association. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/492 
Who Benefits from Economic Development?: 
Reply 
By GARY S. FIELDS* 
Before the appearance of my 1977 paper 
in this Review, it was widely thought that 
the income distribution worsened during the 
economic growth which took place in Brazil 
during the 1960's. My paper demonstrated 
that the familiar data, when analyzed from 
an absolute perspective, could show that the 
poor had benefited from growth. I found 
that the entire income distribution shifted, 
benefiting every income class; that the pro- 
portion of the economically active popula- 
tion with incomes below the poverty level 
(as defined by Brazilian standards) declined 
during the decade; that those who remained 
poor were less poor than before in absolute 
terms; and that the rate of growth of income 
among the poor was at least as great as the 
rate of growth among the nonpoor. These 
results came as a surprise to me, and so I 
did not expect that my conclusion-that 
Brazil seemed to do better on the income 
distribution front than many observers had 
originally thought-would be received un- 
critically by others. 
The preceding comments paint a less rosy 
picture. Previously used data are shown to 
be deficient in important respects and new 
evidence is offered which contradicts the 
old. Because of this new and more critical 
evidence, I myself am less certain of what 
actually happened. But as I shall show, this 
latest reexamination also confirms some of 
the more positive aspects of the Brazilian 
experience. It is fair to say that neither the 
most favorable nor the most unfavorable 
position can be sustained unambiguously. 
I 
Montek Ahluwalia, John Duloy, Graham 
Pyatt, and T. N. Srinivasan (hereafter A-D- 
P-S) criticize my analysis of changing in- 
come distribution in Brazil on three counts: 
limitations of the data used in my study; 
illogic of an approximation procedure; and 
qualitatively dissimilar results under seem- 
ingly plausible assumptions. Let me deal 
with these in turn. 
We would do well to remember that I 
used the data from Albert Fishlow's 1972 
paper with no adjustment save an interpola- 
tion. I used Fishlow's data without modi- 
fication for methodological reasons-I 
wanted to show that qualitatively different 
results would emerge from a different kind 
of analysis (absolute vs. relative). Fishlow's 
data did not permit the analysis of families 
nor the use of income group-specific price 
deflators, both of which A-D-P-S criticize in 
my work. Nevertheless, some at the World 
Bank, among them Ahluwalia (1974), have 
in the past regarded Fishlow's data as reli- 
able enough to cite conclusions derived 
therefrom and to use the data in their own 
research. 
Ahluwalia et al.'s second point concerns 
my interpolation assumptions. I assumed 
that all those in the income class NCr$0-2.8 
had the same income, that 75 percent of 
them (=2.1, the poverty line +2.8, the 
range of the income bracket) were "poor," 
and that the remaining 25 percent of them 
were not. Under these assumptions, I esti- 
mated the proportion poor as 35.5 percent 
of the population in 1970. Ahluwalia et al. 
regard these assumptions as illogical, and in 
at least one way they are right: if the poor 
are defined as those with incomes below 
NCr$2.1, the other 25 percent in the income 
group 0-2.8 should properly have been con- 
sidered poor as well, since by assumption, 
*Associate professor of labor economics and eco- 
nomics, Cornell University. Thanks are due to Paul 
Beckerman, Albert Fishlow, and Graham Pyatt for 
discussions of earlier drafts of their comments and of 
my reply. However, what emerges is my own statement 
and not necessarily a consensus position on all points. 
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their incomes were below the poverty line 
also. By referring to the poorest 35.5 percent 
as the poor, a misstatement arose. In foot- 
note 6 of my 1977 paper, as quoted in 
A-D-P-S's introductory paragraph, I stated 
that the average income of the poor must 
have risen at an above average rate; that 
statement should have been expressed con- 
ditional on 35.5 percent being the propor- 
tion poor. Ahluwalia et al. accurately noted 
my imprecision. One implication of their 
critique is that the number 35.5 percent 
merits less weight than I gave it in the 1977 
paper. This point has a bearing on the inter- 
pretation of other of their results, discussed 
below. 
Ahluwalia et al. are quite correct on their 
third point: qualitatively dissimilar results 
are possible based on Fishlow's 1972 data. 
They have ingeniously displayed the various 
possibilities for the proportion poor (i.e., 
incomes less than NCr$2.1) and their in- 
come share. I would prefer to state their 
conclusions in the following way: 
1) It is logically possible, though -not 
proven, that: There was a greater per- 
centage poor in Brazil in 1970 than in 1960. 
2) It is logically possible, though not 
proven, that: The average income of the 
poorest 35.5 percent grew at a lower rate 
than the incomes of the other 64.5 percent 
between 1960 and 1970. 
3) Statements 1) and 2) cannot both be 
true, that is: It is true either that the per- 
centage poor fell or the average income of 
the poorest 35.5 percent grew faster than the 
average for the nonpoor or both. 
4) With certainty, we can say from 
Fishlow's original data that: The average 
income of the poorest 37.0 percent (the pro- 
portion in the two lowest income classes in 
1960) grew at an above average rate. 
What are we to make of these various 
findings? Following the logic of A-D-P-S's 
argument, the figure 35.5 percent poor (my 
estimate for 1970) should be accorded no 
particular significance, since it was derived 
under assumptions which A-D-P-S regard as 
inappropriate. We have all accepted 37.0 
percent as the proportion poor in 1960, 
though even that figure is somewhat arbi- 
trary. Suppose that 37.0 percent is used as a 
reference figure for 1970. How did the in- 
comes of the poorest 37.0 percent change 
over the decade? From Fishlow's 1972 data, 
I can only conclude that they benefited 
from growth at an above average rate, as the 
following paragraph shows. 
How much above average was the growth 
rate of income of the poorest 37.0 percent? 
The answer depends on the particular 
assumption made concerning the shape of 
the income distribution within the 
NCr$0-2.8 income class. Various possibili- 
ties are illustrated in my 1976 paper. There, 
I showed that the poorest 37.0 percent of 
the population received at least 5.4 percent 
of the income in 1970, which is the same as 
A-D-P-S's lower limit (equation (2') 
evaluated at P=37.0 percent).' Since the 
poorest 37.0 percent received a smaller 
share, 5.2 percent, in 1960, their share rose 
even assuming the minimum possible in- 
crease. And this minimum increase is based 
on perfect inequality of income distribution 
among those earning less than NCr$2.8, 
hardly a plausible assumption.2 The more 
equal the distribution within the 0-2.8 
group, the greater the growth in income 
share of the poorest. Hence, under any con- 
sistent assumptions the average income of 
the poorest 37.0 percent grew at an above 
average rate. 
In short, my main empirical conclusion 
-that the poor in Brazil experienced per- 
centage income gains at least as great as 
those of the nonpoor-holds up to the 
A-D-P-S critique, if in both years we define 
the reference group of the poor as 37.0 
percent (which is the unquestioned figure 
based on the 1960 census) and if we accept 
Fishlow's original data for both years. How- 
ever, as A-D-P-S rightly point out, if we 
seek to interpolate the number poor and 
their average income, a wide range of possi- 
bilities is consistent with the published data. 
It is not certain from these data that a 
1I report 5.49 percent in my 1976 paper. Ahluwalia 
et al.'s constraint implies a value of 5.41 percent. The 
difference is due to rounding. 
2Perfect inequality is where some in that income 
class earn NCr$2.8 and the rest earn zero, the number 
of each being determined by the amount of total in- 
come which that group receives. 
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smaller proportion of the population fell 
below a constant real absolute poverty line 
and that the average income among those 
remaining poor increased, though this may 
have been the case. Less favorable outcomes 
are also consistent with the available data. 
But it remains impossible, given our accep- 
tance of the original data, that everything 
went wrong in the sense of both a growing 
proportion in poverty and a decline in their 
average income relative to that of the rest of 
the population. Of course, if the original 
data are regarded as unsuitable for poverty 
analysis, anything is possible, as the other 
commentators eek to demonstrate. 
Paul Beckerman and Donald Coes (here- 
after B-C) have recalculated the absolute 
poverty estimates in my paper by replacing 
the implicit GDP price deflator which I used 
by the price index for Sao Paulo. The two 
cost-of-living indices are 35.32 (implicit de- 
flator) and 38.26 (Sao Paulo index). The 
difference between these numbers does not 
seem great, nor does the difference between 
the annual rates: 42.8 and 44.0 percent. Yet, 
by using the Sao Paulo index, estimated 
absolute poverty in 1970 is much greater 
and the participation of the poor in eco- 
nomic growth is correspondingly reduced. 
I differ with the authors' dismissal of the 
absolute poverty approach to income dis- 
tribution change, specifically their claim 
that "... the method itself cannot provide 
meaningful quantitative statements about 
changes in income earned by different 
groups, due to its sensitivity to small 
changes in the measured rate of real income 
growth" (p. 249). They reach this conclusion 
based on the judgment that the differences 
in price index are "small." 
In fact, the differences are large. Mean 
income went from NCr$5.52 in 1960 to 
NCr$258.1 in 1970, both expressed in cur- 
rent cruzeiros. With the price index I used, 
mean income in constant cruzeiros comes to 
7.31. With the index they suggest, the mean 
is 6.74. By my estimates, mean income in- 
creased by 32 percent over the decade. By 
their estimates, the increase in mean income 
was 22 percent. Thus, the overall rate of 
growth is reduced by one-third if the Sao 
Paulo price index is used rather than the 
implicit price deflator! This differential is 
hardly small. Think what it does to the 
whole macro-economic discussion of Bra- 
zilian growth, especially the post-1967 
"miracle." 
Compared with this macro-economic 
effect, the consequences of using a different 
price index seem rather small, for example, 
their estimate of percentage poor in 1970 as 
37.3 vs. mine of 35.5 percent. Note too that 
by their estimates the incomes of the poor 
grew faster than those of the nonpoor (38 
vs. 22 percent). Qualitatively, at least, my 
published results hold up. 
The conclusions I would draw from B-C's 
findings differ from theirs. I would conclude 
that macro-economic data on real income 
change are themselves highly sensitive to the 
price index used; that estimates of change in 
absolute income and absolute poverty are 
similarly sensitive; that their results reaffirm 
my conclusion that the poor did share at 
least proportionally in the economic growth 
of Brazil; and that relative inequality in- 
dices being totally insensitive to all this are 
not very helpful.3 These are all matters of 
interpretation where we might disagree. 
On one issue, B-C are in error. They state 
in their concluding paragraph: "The more 
traditional focus on relative inequality re- 
flects the theoretically and empirically plau- 
sible assumption that the marginal utility of 
income is decreasing, while the absolute 
shares approach deliberately ignores this 
motive...." The second part of that state- 
ment is simply wrong. The only reason why 
anyone would want to calculate changes in 
absolute poverty is to focus in on those who 
presumably have the highest marginal utility 
of income (the poor) to the exclusion of 
those whose marginal utilities are assumed 
to be lower. 
Albert Fishlow's comment presents new 
evidence claiming that poverty did not di- 
minish in Brazil in the 1970's. My 1977 
3Obviously, their Lorenz curve is the same as mine. 
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paper claimed that it did. What is not at 
issue is the reliability of the source of the 
basic data, since in both instances, the 
source is Fishlow himself (or more precisely, 
his rendering of Brazilian census data).4 
What is at issue is which data are most 
appropriate. 
Fishlow bases his claim that poverty did 
not diminish on a data set different from the 
one he used earlier. His 1972 paper ex- 
amined changes in income inequality be- 
tween 1960 and 1970 among individuals in 
the economically active population. His 
present note, on the other hand, uses data 
released in the interim to compare families. 
If the Brazilian data are to be believed, what 
they are telling us is that poverty was les- 
sened among individuals but not among 
families. Thus, an assessment of the distri- 
butional performance of the Brazilian econ- 
omy in the 1960's turns on the choice of 
recipient unit. Fishlow claims that family 
income comparisons are clearly superior 
for studying income distribution change. 
I disagree. 
Other, more specific, points are raised in 
Fishlow's comment. He writes that my 
manner of constructing a poverty line is 
"both critical to the findings and quite ille- 
gitimate" (p. 250). He is wrong on both 
counts. Drawing the poverty line at 2.1 is 
not critical. The same qualitative results 
would have been found had the poverty line 
been drawn at 3.3 (the cutoff of the next 
higher income bracket). In the absence of 
reason to suppose otherwise, it is certainly 
legitimate and defensible to do what I did: 
to approximate the proportion of individu- 
als who are poor by the proportion of fami- 
lies which are poor. He complains that I 
used uncorrected data. That is legitimate 
when only uncorrected data are available. 
In his 1972 paper, Fishlow did not correct 
for income in kind or for regional price 
differences in making intertemporal income 
distribution comparisons, and so neither did I 
when I used his data. It is legitimate, I 
submit, to include individual zero-income 
recipients, since unemployment reduction is 
an important means of poverty alleviation.5 
To exclude zero-income workers is, I think, 
a cure worse than the disease. But I must 
take responsibility for an unpublished 
arithmetic error which invalidates the state- 
ment in footnote 7 of my 1977 paper-the 
results are materially affected if zero-income 
workers are excluded. 
Some of Fishlow's calculations are mutu- 
ally inconsistent. His note argues that the 
correct poverty line for families is NCr$3.3 
for 1960 and an equivalent poverty line for 
1970 is NCr$125. Even if we accept these 
figures as equivalent, and I hesitate to, the 
ratio of prices is 125/3.3 = 37.9. This implies 
that the 1960 mean income (NCr$9.2) is 
equivalent to NCr$348.5 when measured in 
1970 prices in nominal terms. The mean 
income in 1970 was NCr$401. The rate of 
growth of mean income is therefore (401 - 
348.5)/348.5 - 1 = 15 percent, not 25 percent 
as Fishlow reports. Either the appropriate 
poverty line is not NCr$125 or the rate of 
growth is not 25 percent. Fishlow cannot 
have it both ways. Which way he has it 
considerably affects his comparisons of in- 
come growth of the poor relative to the 
average. And let me record my hesitation in 
accepting Fishlow's calculation of changes 
in the Sen index based on the type of infor- 
mation available, especially since there is an 
inconsistency between the claim that the I 
component of the Sen index increased and 
the earlier observation that the poor's in- 
come rose albeit slightly. 
4Fishlow's tabulations go beyond the published data 
in at least one important way. The census publications 
do not report actual income shares for each income 
group. Fishlow published derived shares, which he ob- 
tained using a two-way procedure: in the case of the 
lowest income bracket, by fitting a Pareto distribution; 
for the other income brackets, by setting the mean 
equal to the midpoint. This procedure introduces par- 
ticular assumptions about the distribution of income 
within the group classified as poor. We have no way of 
knowing whether these assumptions are or are not 
accurate. When I wrote my 1977 paper, I did not know 
that the income shares published by Fishlow were 
fitted, not actual, nor apparently did the other com- 
mentators in preparing their comments. 
5The census evidence cited by Fishlow showing that 
most of the unremunerated workers were found in 
agriculture, not in unemployment, is in direct conflict 
with the findings of P. 1. Singer on which I had based 
my earlier judgment. 
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The new evidence presented in Fishlow's 
comment offers us a choice-on which in- 
come recipient unit (families or individuals) 
is most appropriate for purposes of inter- 
temporal analysis, on whether a concern 
with income or expenditure distribution is 
of more interest, on the legitimacy or il- 
legitimacy of uncorrected income distribu- 
tion data. I believe I might be forgiven if in 
1975 (when the first draft of my paper was 
written) or in 1976 (when the final draft was 
accepted for publication), I accepted Fish- 
low's earlier decisions on these questions, 
especially when it is recognized that I was 
trying to show that his own data, analyzed 
with a different type of measure, would sug- 
gest a quite different interpretation. I would 
conclude that Fishlow has not presented a 
"single and compelling" piece of evidence to 
the effect that the poor in Brazil did not 
share in economic growth. Maybe they did, 
maybe they didn't, but his results do not 
sustain an unambiguous conclusion either 
way. 
IV 
My 1977 paper had two purposes, one 
methodological and one empirical. The 
methodological goal was to apply in the 
case of a less-developed country a largely 
overlooked class of absolute measures which 
gauge directly the extent to which the poor 
gain from economic development. At the 
time I wrote the paper (1975), absolute 
poverty measures had seldom been used in a 
dynamic context in studies of LDC's (i.e., 
to measure who benefits how much from 
economic development within a country, 
though Fishlow had effectively introduced 
these measures to construct static poverty 
profiles and Ahluwalia had used these 
measures in a cross section of countries). I 
hoped to show that those who wish to give 
predominant weight to countries' progress 
toward alleviating economic misery might 
find these absolute measures (changes in 
proportion of income units which are poor 
and changes in average income among the 
poor) more convenient than the more 
familiar measures of relative inequality 
(changes in Lorenz curves, Gini coefficients, 
income shares of particular percentile 
groups, etc.) for gauging the beneficiaries of 
growth. 
The empirical goal was to reexamine the 
specific case of Brazilian growth in the 
1960's. Toward that end, my results estab- 
lished that the same income distribution 
data, when analyzed from an absolute 
rather than from a relative perspective, 
yielded a qualitatively distinct and de- 
cidedly more positive picture of who ben- 
efited. 
I believe the methodological objective has 
been largely satisfied. Though my paper 
provoked much discussion, pro and con, I 
am unaware that anyone on either side has 
rejected in principle the call for applying 
absolute tools to the study of income dis- 
tribution change, at least in conjunction 
with relative inequality measures if not as a 
replacement for them, though Beckerman 
and Coes reject absolute measures in prac- 
tice. We are not likely to witness a return to 
the debates of the mid-1970's over whether 
the participation of the poor in economic 
growth is better measured by the Gini coef- 
ficient rather than by a Theil index, Kuznets 
ratio, Atkinson index, Pareto coefficient, log 
variance, or what have you. To the contrary, 
the development community is now groping 
toward the most appropriate way of measur- 
ing the alleviation of absolute poverty. This 
concern is reflected in such current phrases 
as "redistribution with growth," "meeting 
basic needs," "new directions in develop- 
ment assistance," "progress and commit- 
ment for the poor majority," "trickle down," 
and "distributional weights." 
The empirical issue remains unsettled. In 
the last two or three years, the absolute 
approach has been applied to the study of 
distribution and development in other 
countries besides Brazil. The existing litera- 
ture is surveyed and new evidence presented 
in my forthcoming book. 
Scholars of integrity welcome the oppor- 
tunity to subject earlier ideas to tests on new 
and better data. The evidence presented in 
the three comments, though new, is not nec- 
essarily better. But it is disturbing. The 
additional evidence shows recent Brazilian 
economic history in a less favorable light 
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than I portrayed it before, though in my 
judgment, less dismal than Fishlow's com- 
ment suggests. This can only raise new 
doubts on the extent to which the poor 
shared in Brazilian growth. 
The several comments have also raised 
important questions about the suitability 
of published income distribution data for 
absolute poverty analysis. Since the ap- 
pearance of my 1977 paper, and indeed in 
response to it, the Brazilian data base has 
come under close scrutiny and some techni- 
cal limitations brought to attention. In addi- 
tion to the fine points about the specifics of 
census reporting procedures, and tabula- 
tions derived therefrom (see fn. 4), doubts 
about the quality of the underlying data are 
also raised by the very observation that, 
given a nearly constant demographic struc- 
ture, the family and individual distributions 
produce such divergent results. 
Attention is rarely given to technical 
matters such as these; too often, we simply 
accept whatever data are available. But as 
the new evidence indicates, these technical 
issues are paramount in coming to even 
a qualitative judgment on distributional as- 
pects of Brazilian development.6 
Notwithstanding our differences, I expect 
that the several commentators would join 
me in two final observations: given the 
available resources, much more could have 
been done than was done to alleviate eco- 
nomic misery in Brazil; and much more can 
be done in the future if the political will is 
there. 
'It might be noted that technical considerations 
were also prominent in earlier debates on changing 
income distribution in the course of the economic 
development of India. 
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